Tuesday, July 3, 2012

Civic right interpretation of the Second Amendment?

Yet another reason that the Heller-McDonald decisions are unconstitutional besides judicial misconduct.

Not only do they go against the proper interpretation of the Second Amendment as explained by Justice William O. Douglas, who was on the Supreme Court at the time of Miller in Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 (1972):

The police problem is an acute one not because of the Fourth Amendment, but because of the ease with which anyone can acquire a pistol. A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are constitutional rights protected by the Second Amendment, which reads, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason why a State may not require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone except the police.
The leading case is United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, upholding a federal law making criminal the shipment in interstate commerce of a sawed-off shotgun. The law was upheld, there being no evidence that a sawed-off shotgun had "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id., at 178. The Second Amendment, it was held, "must be interpreted and applied" with the view of maintaining a "militia."
"The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be 151*151secured through the Militia—civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." Id., at 178-179.
Critics say that proposals like this water down the Second Amendment. Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep alive the militia. But if watering-down is the mood of the day, I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment. I share with Judge Friendly a concern that the easy extension of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, to "possessory offenses" is a serious intrusion on Fourth Amendment safeguards. "If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows `that criminal activity may be afoot.' " 436 F. 2d, at 39, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 30.

Douglas' explanation makes sense in relation to three rules of Constitutionalinterpretation:
  •  Provisions of the Constitution are mutually consistent. There are no internal logical contradictions, except that a provision of an amendment inconsistent with a previous provision supersedes that provision.
  • None of the words are without force and effect, except those superseded by amendments, unless such amendments are repealed. Except for the statement of purpose in the preamble, every word was intended by the Framers to be legally normative, and not just advisory, declaratory, aspirational, or exhortatory. Verba intelligi ut aliquid operantur debent. Words should be interpreted to give them some effect.
  •  Rights and powers are complementary. Every right recognized by the Constitution is an immunity, that is, a right against a positive action by government, and is equivalent to a restriction on delegated powers. Conversely, every delegated power is a restriction on immunities. An immunity may be expressed either as a declaration of the right, or as a restriction on powers.
The second points out that not only is the Second Amendment a declaration of a right, but it is a limitation upon Congress' power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 16:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

And the following purposes stated for adopting the constitution:

insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare

One of the stated purposes of the US Constitution was to address matters of common defence--self-defence is not mentioned any where in the Constitution, and it is not explicitly stated in the Second Amendment.  On the other hand, the Civic right interpretation ties the Second Amendment to the Militia clauses and Congress' power over the militia.

There is another clause in the US Constitution which allows for  the federal government protect us from harms that we inflict upon ourselves, harms that threaten our health and our survival.

Article IV, Section 4
"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."

Not only does the Constitution contradict the concept that one can wage war against the government since the only crime mentioned in the Constitution is precisely that (Article III, Section iii), but the domestic violence clause of the Constitution takes it beyond mere insurrection.

On May 29,1787, the very first day of business at the Constitutional Convention, the first speaker's most vehement point was the need to have a central government strong enough to assure survival in the face of threats both domestic and foreign. Alexander Hamilton considered domestic dangers "more alarming than the arms and arts of foreign nations," and that the entire resources of the nation are to be made available to deal with a condition of domestic violence. Spending – for whatever danger was at hand – "ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community."

In James Madison's Notes of Debates (Ohio Univ. Press, 1984), there is no indication that the framers intended Art. IV, Sec. 4 to be limited to temporary insurrections and massive criminal assaults. At the convention on August 30, 1787, a motion was made to strike out "domestic violence" and insert in its place the term "insurrections." That motion was defeated. They did not want to limit the federal obligation to any particular type of event. (Page 560 of the Notes.)
Violence was clearly intended to mean more than just rebellions or physical challenge to government.
The Constitution allows for items which are detrimental to the general welfare, which firearms are, to be regulated.  This addresses concerns of public safety and general welfare, which was yet another concern of the founders--they would be appalled that the Second Amendment was being used to justify not only high levels of gun violence, but to say that insurrection was constitutional, let alone patriotic.

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