William Rawle on the Second Amendment

NOTE:   The right judicially created by the Heller-McDonald cases does not extend beyond the curtilage (boundaries of the home).

I've been quoting William Rawle a lot lately since it is pretty much a given that there is no right to walk about carrying weapons in such a way that is likely to commit a disturbance of the peace  (see Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Chapter XI. Of Offences Against the Public Peace).

William Rawle explains this in relation to the Second Amendment in his treatise "A View of the Constitution of the United States", 125--26 1829 (2d ed.):

"This right ought not, however, in any government, to be abused to the disturbance of the public peace.

An assemblage of persons with arms, for an unlawful purpose, is an indictable offence, and even the carrying of arms abroad by a single individual, attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them, would be sufficient cause to require him to give surety of the peace. If he refused he would be liable to imprisonment."

In other words, people are well within their rights to call the police if they see someone carrying a weapon in public:  after all, that is the police's job to deal with people who could possibly be causing a breech of the peace.

In fact, there are some seriously good legal precedent that say someone carrying a weapon in public must give surety, or at least have some form of licence.

While the Cruikshank case isn't really useful for Second Amendment precedent, the Presser case sure as hell is where it says that the government has the right to licence the carrying of weapons outside the Militia context.

Also, it's interesting that people cite to Rawle and call his treatise a landmark text.  They even mention that Rawle says that the Second Clause is a corollary clause, yet they miss that the word "corollary" implies a relationship:

a statement that follows readily from a previous statement.

In other words, there is a relationship between the first and second clauses of the Second Amendment, whether people want to admit that these days.  The Miller Court reiterated that when it said, "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view."

And, as Presser pointed out:

It cannot be successfully questioned that the state governments, unless restrained by their own constitutions, have the power to regulate or prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except in the case of peaceable assemblies to perform the duties or exercise the privileges of citizens of the United States, and have also the power to control and regulate the organization, drilling, and parading of military bodies and associations, except when such bodies or associations, are [116 U.S. 252, 268]   authorized by the militia laws of the United States. The exercise of this power by the states is necessary to the public peace, safety, and good order. To deny the power would be to deny the right of the state to disperse assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and rapine.

I find it hard to say that carrying arms in public outside of the militia/national defence context is in any way a protected act by the Second Amendment.

Heller is wrongly decided and does not properly follow the Second Amendment Jurisprudence as set out by the Supreme Court.

A couple of things to ponder...

William Rawle on the Domestic Violence Clause (Article 4, Section 4 of the US Constitution):

"Not a word in the Constitution is intended to be inoperative, and one so significant as the present was not lightly inserted. The United States are therefore bound to carry it into effect whenever the occasion arises, and finding as we do, in the same clause, the engagement to protect each state against domestic violence, which can only be by the arms of the Union, we are assisted in a due construction of the means of enforcing the guaranty. If the majority of the people of a state deliberately and peaceably resolve to relinquish the republican form of government, they cease to be members of the Union. If a faction, an inferior number, make such an effort, and endeavour to enforce it by violence, the case provided for will have arisen, and the Union is bound to employ its power to prevent it."

First off, he points out that

"Not a word in the Constitution is intended to be inoperative, and one so significant as the present was not lightly inserted."

That reiterates the point I keep mentioning from Marbury v. Madison (It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect;–Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 [1803]).  So, no matter how much people may want to wish away the Militia from the Second Amendment, it would only make that "mere surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if such is to be the construction". 

But I have also pointed out that Rawle said this about the Second Amendment:

In the second article, it is declared, that a well regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state; a proposition from which few will dissent. Although in actual war, the services of regular troops are confessedly more valuable;yet, while peace prevails, and in the commencement of a war before a regular force can be raised, the militia form the palladium of the country. They are ready to repel invasion,to suppress insurrection, and preserve the good order and peace of government. That they should be well regulated, is judiciously added. A disorderly militia is disgraceful to itself, and dangerous not to the enemy, but to its own country. The duty of the state government is, to adopt such regulations as will tend to make good soldiers with the least interruptions of the ordinary and useful occupations of civil life. In this all the Union has a strong and visible interest.

Rawle then goes on to point out: "The corollary, from the first position, is, that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The word "corollary" means "a proposition that follows from (and is often appended to) one already proved."

Again, that means that both clauses must be interpreted in relation to each other.

And if you want to take the next paragraph to mean personal arms:

"The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both."

I would point you to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16, which gives congress the power to arm the militia.  It was that power that led to the Second Amendment being written: press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/tocs/a1_8_16.html

But, it isn't so much the Second Amendment pseudo-scholarship that I want to address here as much as the belief that there is some "right" to revolt against the US Government. We also add to the overwhelming evidence that that is silly, something called the Domestic Violence clause:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

This is what Rawle is talking about when he says:

If the majority of the people of a state deliberately and peaceably resolve to relinquish the republican form of government, they cease to be members of the Union. If a faction, an inferior number, make such an effort, and endeavour to enforce it by violence, the case provided for will have arisen, and the Union is bound to employ its power to prevent it.

So, if you are going to try and use obsolete and obscure clauses in the Constitution to try and justify your silly "gun rights" position keep in mind you have a few things working against you:  history (Shays' Rebellion) and the document itself.

Of course, you could try and say that the we should use the modern meaning of the term "Domestic Violence".

BTW, Rawle wasn't the only one to point out this section of the Constitution addressed insurrection.  Here's Joseph Story:

§ 1808. The want of a provison of this nature was felt, as a capital defect in the plan of the confederation, as it might in its consequences endanger, if not overthrow, the Union. Without a guaranty, the assistance to be derived from the national government in repelling domestic dangers,which might threaten the existence of the state constitutions,could not be demanded, as a right, from thenational government. Usurpation might raise its standard,and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more, than behold the encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction might erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law; while no succour could be constitutionally afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters ofthe government. But this is not all. The destruction of the national government itself, or of neighbouring states,might result from a successful rebellion in a single state.Who can determine, what would have been the issue, if the insurrection in Massachusetts, in 1787, had been successful,and the malecontents had been headed by a Caesar ora Cromwell? If a despotic or monarchical governmentwere established in one state, it would bring on the ruin ofthe whole republic. Montesquieu has acutely remarked,that confederated governments should be formed only between states, whose form of government is not only similar,but also republican.

As I like to say, Some people who say they are defending the Constitution need to bone up on what they are claiming to defend.

Instead, they seek to make themselves the "domestic dangers" the Constitution was written to prevent.