Why I should love Heller-McDonald!

First off, I want to repeat something I mentioned in the Wisconsin AFL-CIO  post on Gun Control from yesterday

Corporate America could care less about gun control, traditional family values or abortion (or the latest useful single issue-of-the-day), nor does it feel totally comfortable with the extremism of the religious front for the Right, but the overall movement serves corporate economic interests perfectly.

 If you missed the fact that Dick Heller and Otis McDonald didn't foot the bill for their cases going to the Supreme Court, or that the outcomes would most likely be different had they been footing the bill--these cases were funded by the Cato Institute.

I have to admit that I am not sure of why Cato would have funded these cases other than as an experiment to see how much they could use the judicial system to thwart the democratic process.  It's more of a cynical ploy to use the type of thing the right calls "Judicial Activism" to the right's advantage.  Although, if the intent was "gun rights", these cases fail miserably!

Not to mention, gunloons can chant their meaningless mantra of "individual right", but these decisions re pretty much useless if your goal is some sort of significant form of "gun right".

Once again here is the Heller-McDonald language:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Heller at 54-5

Which has as a footnote (26):

We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.

Better yet:

But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home. Heller at 64

From McDonald:

It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 54). We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 54–55). We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms. McDonald at 39-40

The only thing off the table is anything that purports to be a ban. Which leads to my question: had Chicago theoretically allowed for registrations (as does New York City) since that is not an “absolute prohibition”– would the law have passed constitutional muster? After all, NYC’s law has been around for 99 years: doesn’t that count as a longstanding regulatory measure?

Likewise, Candidates cannot say that gun laws violate the Second Amendment if they do not infringe upon the rights to truly “law abiding citizens” to own firearms. As the Court said (twice) “the right to keep and bear arms is ‘not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’”  Neither of these decisions got rid of registration or background checks and the most amusing aspect was that Dick Heller was refused a gun permit after all this was over!  Not only that, Heller's appeal of that decision upheld DC's Firearms restrictions!

Challenges to firearms laws post-Heller-McDonald have pretty much fallen on their faces with the Brady Campaign issuing a report calling them  a "Hollow Victory".  According to that report: "Since the Heller ruling, criminals and the gun lobby have brought more than 400 challenges to gun laws, an average of more than two legal challenges every week over the last three years. Yet, the courts have overwhelmingly rejected those cases."

And why not?  It seems that pretty much the only thing which is off the table is a firearms ban.  Othwerwise, "longstanding regulatory measures" are pretty much OK according to the new interpretation of the Second Amendment.

There is now no reason why a politician cannot support stricter regulation of firearms using these shoddy decisions and remain "faithful to the Second Amendment"--Well, other than the NRA will do everything to crucify them.  But, the question also remains how relevant is the NRA to the political process?

Paul Waldman, of the American Prospect, has recently argued that the NRA's dominance is a myth. He has looked closely at the figures and writes, “Despite what the NRA has long claimed, it neither delivered Congress to the Republican party in 1994 nor delivered the White House to George W. Bush in 2000.” He also argues that NRA money has no impact on congressional elections, as it spreads its money over so many races, and that NRA endorsements are “almost meaningless” as most go to incumbent Republicans with little chance of losing.

More cause for concern came on April 17th, when the American Legislative Exchange Council ended its task force responsible for promoting pro-gun legislation. This followed the controversy over ALEC’s ties to "stand your ground" laws around the country. ALEC will now focus its efforts on jobs, free markets and growth, but not firearms.  Just remember that ALEC, Cato, and the Koch Brothers are pretty much the same thing.

Developments are beginning to suggest an attenuated NRA. The organisation has had its political power called into question, lost an ally in promoting gun laws, and caters to an ageing demographic, on top of pushing a potentially dangerous product that is of less interest to American households. Time will tell, but it seems reasonable to wonder whether the NRA has as much firepower as it claims.

 In fact, While support for “gun control” in the abstract has declined in recent years as the issue has been out of the spotlight, widespread support for specific measures to restrict gun sales remains as high as ever.  If anything, the Heller-McDonald decisions make it easier for a politician to say he is "pro-Second Amendment" yet pro-gun control.  The real question is how long can guns remain a wedge issue?

People may have begun to wake up on this one, or will just see the handwriting is on the wall for the concept of "gun rights".

See also:

• The Myth Of NRA Dominance Part I: The NRA’s Ineffective Spending
• The Myth Of NRA Dominance Part II: Overrated Endorsements
• The Myth Of NRA Dominance Part III: Two Elections The NRA Did Not Win
• The Myth Of NRA Dominance Part IV: The Declining Role Of Guns In American Society
• the Economist, Guns in America: The NRA’s star may be on the wane, Apr 19th 2012 
• Brady Campaign, Hollow Victory

The Cato Institute Study on GDUs

via The Truth About Guns where they loved this study, I mean what's not to love when the Cato boys are singin' the gun-rights song.

The ostensible purpose of gun control legislation is to reduce firearm deaths and injuries. The restriction of access to firearms will make criminals unable to use guns to shoot people. Gun control laws will also reduce the number of accidental shootings. Those are the desired effects, at least in theory. It is important, however, for conscientious policymakers to consider not only the stated goals of gun control regulations, but the actual results that they produce.

What would be the effect of depriving ordinary, law-abiding citizens from keeping arms for self-defense? One result seems certain: the law-abiding would be at a distinct disadvantage should criminals acquire guns from underground markets. After all, it is simply not possible for police officers to get to every scene where they are urgently needed.

Now everyone knows that surveys and polls can be easily manipulated by phrasing the questions one way or the other. But this is too funny. I hope you're sitting down.

This paper uses a collection of news reports of self-defense with guns over an eight-year period to survey the circumstances and outcomes of defensive gun uses in America.

The conclusion: "The bottom line is that gun owners stop a lot of criminal mayhem every year."

What's your opinion?  Is that a riot, or what? Those of us who look at new reports of shootings can tell you that the ratio between improper gun use and proper gun use is, I don't know, what would you say it is? In the past I've put it at 100 to 1.  What do you think?

Please leave a comment.

Merchants of Death

The protagonist in Christopher Buckley's 1994 Novel, Thank You for Smoking , Nick Naylor, is the chief spokesman for the Academy of Tobacco Studies, a tobacco industry lobbying firm that promotes the benefits of cigarettes. Naylor uses high-profile media events and intentionally provocative rhetoric in order to highlight what his clients view as an unfair crusade against tobacco and nicotine products.

Naylor also has created an informal association of lobbyists from other industries that are subjected to routine vilification in the media, e.g. Polly Bailey, a lobbyist for the alcohol/spirits industry, and Bobby Jay Bliss, who represents the firearms industry. Collectively, they form what is known as the M.O.D. Squad, a reference to the title of the crime show, although in this case, "MOD" stands for "Merchants Of Death".

Part of this post comes from the fact that the Koch Funded Cato Institute, particularly Robert Levy. has been involved in a similar pattern of criticising action against the Tobacco Industry in addition to his footing the bill for DC v. Heller. But the real issue is that the firearms industry tries to hide any possible illegal activity from public scrutiny. The Tiahrt Amendment prohibits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) from releasing information from its firearms trace database to anyone other than a law enforcement agency or prosecutor in connection with a criminal investigation, but that also hides the data for gun running from public scrutiny.

Why would the firearms industry fight regulation if it weren't for the illegal domestic trade in weapons, which bleeds out to other countries (e.g., Mexico and the UK)? Do these companies factor the illicit sales into their business plan? The gun lobby and the gun industry do not like laws that could result in a reduction in gun sales, even sales of guns that make their way into the illegal market.

Ppeer-reviewed, published research has documented that laws to limit bulk sales reduce gun trafficking. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association of Virginia's law showed that for guns recovered in crime in the Northeast and traced, the odds that a gun was purchased in Virginia relative to gun dealers elsewhere in the Southeast were reduced 66 percent after the law took effect (Weil, p. 1760).

The Virginia State Crime Commission concluded: "Virginia's one-gun-a-month statute has had its intended effect of reducing Virginia's status as a source state for gun trafficking. The imposition of the law does not appear to create an onerous burden for law-abiding gun purchasers" (Virginia State Crime Commission, p. 7). According to Helen Fahey, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, "Since passage of the legislation, instances of gunrunning have decreased dramatically."

The gun industry seeks to defend itself against gun control advocates by talking about constitutional rights and the preservation of basic American values, essentially the gun industry is in business to make money. Hoovers.com (2011) reports that there are approximately 300 gun manufacturers operating in the U.S. who earn a combined profit of $5 billion. Additionally, there are a number of foreign-based companies that sell firearms in the lucrative U.S. market and include some of the more well-known and profitable companies, such as Smith & Wesson (England), Beretta (Italy), Browning (Japan) and Glock (Austria). However, the distinction gets blurred because foreign based companies set up U.S. subsidiaries to get around import restrictions. Moreover, gaining information on these companies is difficult because all but one major gun manufacturer – Sturm, Ruger & Company – are privately owned, and conceal information that is required of publicly traded corporations.

Like the tobacco industry, the firearms industry has come under scrutiny for their culpability in the illegal and violence use of guns. While there have been numerous lawsuits brought by local municipalities against gun manufacturers and gun dealers, they were rendered null and void by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Firearms Act of 2005, which barred lawsuits against the industry as had occurred against the tobacco industry. Overall, the industry has resisted calls by the government to police itself and its dealers.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) estimates that 60% of all crime-related guns originate from one percent of licensed gun dealers, and that in a typical year 85% of licensed gun dealers sell no guns involved in crime; thus it is easy for gun manufacturers to identify those dealers who may be acting unethically by profiting from the illegal gun trade. However, when gun manufacturer Smith and Wesson sought to establish a code of conduct for the dealers it did business with, the CEO Ed Schultz and the company were vilified by the NRA and fellow gun manufacturers, leading Schultz to resign and the company to abandon its attempt to enforce a code of conduct. Former gun industry lawyer Robert Ricker likewise has noted that the firearms industry is well aware of the diversion of gun to the illegal market and yet has vigorously closed ranks in its attempt to distance itself from any accountability, knowledge or involvement in that market.

In Feb 2003, Ricker made a sworn affidavit which read in part: “The firearms industry … has long known that the diversion of firearms from legal channels of commerce to the illegal black market … occurs principally at the distributor/dealer level … However … leaders in the industry have consistently resisted taking constructive voluntary action to prevent firearms from ending up in the illegal gun market and have sought to silence others in the industry who have advocated reform”.

One gives tacit aid when someone knows that there is a crime going on, yet fails to act to stop the crime. You can justify in your conscience that you are not actively involved, but as the old saying goes: "if you aren't part of the solution, you are part of the problem". If you are closing your eyes to crime, you are just as much a part of the problem.

See also:

• Weil, Doug and Rebecca Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms, Journal of the American Medical Association 275 (1996):1759-1761
• Virginia State Crime Commission, Report of the Virginia State Crime Commission to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia: Virginia's Law on Handgun Purchase Limits, Richmond, VA: Virginia State Crime Commission. 1996 (House Document No. 28)